In response to a question about Microsoft's monopoly, Mills defined the "Windows franchise" as consisting of Windows and Microsoft Office. This franchise, he said, wasn't going to repeat itself. The tone in his voice when he said that was not just one of pragmatism. I had the distinct feeling that it was of also one of commitment and personal conviction.
Besides the Windows franchise, there are a lot of things that IBM would rather not have repeat themselves. Not buying MS-DOS when it had the chance. Allowing the cloning of PCs. The 32-bit OS debacle (when then-OS/2 partner Bill Gates basically gave IBM its walking papers). Once Microsoft's NT dispatched OS/2 as a viable option, IBM was cast adrift in the fast-growing software segment of Intel-based operating systems. Adding insult to injury, the "Wintel" platform became so heavily commoditised that it was now too easy for enterprise hardware competitors like Dell and the now possibly merging Hewlett-Packard and Compaq to carve out their own slices.
Having lost three golden opportunities (one hardware and two software) to capture a "tax" on every Intel system sold, IBM found itself in a marginalised position quite uncharacteristic of the world's largest computer company, and beholden to the same company that once jilted it--Microsoft.
When Mills looked me straight in the eye and said that it wouldn't happen again, he may have been referring to more than just the Windows franchise. IBM is a company that prefers to control its own destiny. It knows too well the risks of having its fate tied to the whims of Microsoft and Intel. In order to regain control of its destiny and prevent history from repeating itself, the company will have to do some marginalising of its own--particularly to Microsoft and at the expense of Sun. To accomplish that, IBM must do something it failed to do with OS/2. It must provide its customers with a clear path from Microsoft's platforms to extremely compelling alternatives based on its own intellectual property, or, at the very least, to some open-source IP over which it exerts tremendous influence.
Enter Java and Web services
As a tool for marginalising Microsoft, Java is everything OS/2 was not. Java is the heart and soul of IBM's WebSphere (the middleware for the rest of IBM's software portfolio). Java is the primary software vanguard that keeps Microsoft from penetrating the datacenter. Even better, Java represents the first credible threat to Redmond on the client side. By all counts, some version of Java now exists on many more client devices than does Windows (including desktop systems, phones, gaming consoles, set top boxes and even credit cards). Java has the all-important buzz too. 3G networks may be the all-the-rage at this year's CeBIT, but more important are the applications they will enable. Judging by the number of Java-enabled phones (e.g., Sony Ericsson's Z700 and P800), Java is far ahead of the Windows alternative (a variant of Windows CE). Finally, Java is winning the hearts and minds of developers. According to the Hurwitz Group, 35 percent of developers surveyed plan to deploy Web services on Java vs. 15 percent for .Net, and 31 percent plan to use both.
Java is the golden egg and Sun is the goose that laid it. To truly keep history from repeating itself (especially on the server-side, where IBM is somewhat beholden to Sun), IBM has few choices. It can take ownership of Java and, therefore, Sun as well. IBM could also try to dislodge Java from Sun's control and move it into the open-source community where IBM might not own it, but could pretty much have its way with it. When asked about the desire to own Java, IBM's Director for eBusiness Standards Strategy Bob Sutor said "I don't know about owning it, but we'd sure like to see it open sourced."
